Hence in this paper the development of an algorithm for automated cause-consequence diagram construction is described. The algorithm builds on methods developed previously for fault tree construction, such as topology diagrams describing how components are linked together in a system, component decision tables, used to model component behaviour, etc. Using this information a set of rules have been developed which enable automatic construction of the CCD. Once constructed the diagram can be quantified to give exact system reliability. To demonstrate the feasibility of the approach the algorithm is applied to a simple example.
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INTRODUCTION
In his study, Nielsen [1] developed the cause-consequence diagram as a graphical tool for the analysis and description of relevant accidents in complex process plants. The method is based on a combination of standard reliability techniques. The cause diagram is the conventional fault tree used to describe all causes of an undesired event. The consequence diagram is an event-sequential diagram (decision-tree diagram) describing the alternative failure sequences that an abnormal event leads to if one or more of the accident preventing/limiting provisions fail. By using a combination of these reliability methods, the logical connections between independent accident causes and accident consequences can be established [2] . The main symbol in a CCD is a decision box which contains a component/subsystem condition. It is an identical representation of the YES/NO branches in an event tree. Following the YES/NO branches of the decision box the diagram is developed until it terminates in consequence boxes.
The CCD method has advantageous features in both its representation of a systems failure logic and its subsequent quantification. However traditional cause-consequence analysis is based on manual construction of the diagram. This requires a detailed knowledge of the system, plus experience and practice in understanding the failure modes of the components within the system and their effects. The construction is time-consuming and expensive, moreover, it can be a source of human errors. A faster and error free analysis can be performed if the CCD is automatically generated by computer from the system description [2] .
Past work on automating reliability techniques has concentrated on fault tree analysis. As a result, a variety of methods for computerized fault tree synthesis have been developed and published. The most successful are based on the diagraph method [3] and the decision table method [4] . Lapp and Powers introduced a systematic algorithm to deal with control loops based on their digraph method [3] . The authors developed general operators whenever variables on the control loops were encountered in the digraph. A diagraph explicitly describes the relationships between process variables. The fault tree was then constructed by examining the cause and effect relationships indicated on the diagraph.
Salem et al. [4] proposed a method to construct fault trees for general complex systems and implemented an automatic construction method called CAT (Computer Aided Tree). The components were modelled by decision tables describing the relations between the component inputs, component operation and failure modes, and the component outputs. A system topology was used to describe the connections between components. The features of diagraph and decision table methods were combined [5] in a new method for automating fault tree construction appropriate to modelling two-state and continuously variable safety systems. Since decision tables were used to model components behaviour no restriction was placed on the number of discrete states used to represent components behaviour. The gains, showing how changes in input parameters affect the output parameters, were incorporated into these tables enabling the method to deal with control loops.
In this paper previous methods applied to fault tree construction are extended to automate the construction of the CCD.
GENERAL ALGORITHM
In the following sections an algorithm will be described that accepts a description of the system under construction and generates a CCD which can be quantified in a straightforward manner. The automatic generation is based on the following steps:
1. Initially information about the system required by the algorithm is given; 2. The CCD is then automatically constructed by applying the developed algorithm; 5. The cause-consequence diagram is then used to analyse the system considered.
These five steps will be described in more detail in the following sections, 2.1 to 2.5.
Algorithm requirements
In order for the construction algorithm to be implemented detailed information about the system being considered must be given. This information is broken down into: component models, system topology diagram, and failure rate data for the components.
The component models used in this work are in the form of decision tables [4] . For each component its state is combined with all possible inputs from the components with which it is linked, to give outputs which are passed on to other components within the system. The construction of such tables and their use in other automated procedures is described in detail by Salem et al. [4] .
The system topology diagram details how the components inputs and outputs are linked together within the system. The failure rate data includes a description of the failure modes of the components as well as their rate of failure. It is used in the construction of fault trees and their quantification, and hence the final CCD quantification.
For some systems it is also necessary to specify initial states for the components.
The algorithm also requires that an initiating event is identified. At the current stage of the algorithm development this event is given by the user. It depends upon the system under construction and is generally a component, with an associated function, which initiates the system. This is the first event considered in the algorithm.
In order to ensure that the CCD construction process completes and the algorithm does not continually consider components that are linked together, stopping criteria must also be identified. These indicate at which point the algorithm has reached a consequence and hence that path is completed.
A computer program implementing the construction algorithm is currently being developed. The end user will input the components within the system and how they are linked. The program will then draw upon a library of decision tables and construct the CCD diagram.
Construction algorithm
A set of steps have been developed to construct the consequence diagram. For ease of programming, systems have been classified into those that have circuits and those that don't. Where a circuit is defined as a path containing a power supply which starts and ends at the same component and with all components passing current. In the following subsections the steps for the two different cases have been summarised. This is continued until all decision boxes have been developed on both the YES and NO branches until a consequence box is reached. 6. The components with external outputs are reconsidered in turn.
Systems without circuits

Yes
Add decision box related to function if applicable 2. Determine which circuits contain the component and consider them in turn.
Determine the possible outputs of the component
3.
Create a decision box questioning whether there is current/no current in circuit 4. These components are considered in turn and the external output investigated.
If the external output is unknown a decision box is added questioning its state. exists in more than one circuit and conditions exist such that a function is satisfied and hence applied. Then all the circuits in which the component exists must be considered before any further functions can be applied.
Yes
Diagram reduction
In this stage of the diagram generation it is reduced to its most efficient form. This is achieved by inspecting each decision box in the CCD. A decision box is deemed irrelevant if the boxes attached to its NO and YES branches are identical and their consequences are the same. Since the removal of the irrelevant box has no effect on the end result, it is excluded and the next decision box or consequence box in the path put in its place [6] . Figure 2 shows an example of an irrelevant decision box, box 2. In this example the state of component B is irrelevant as whichever path is taken from box 2 the outcome is the same. Since the state of component B is irrelevant, decision box 2 is removed, and then decision box 3 is encountered in its place and is renumbered.
Fig. 2 Cause-consequence diagram reduction
If no further redundancies exist the cause-consequence diagram is deemed minimal [6] .
Development of the fault trees
If a decision box is governed not by a component but by a sub-system then the probability of failure will be obtained via a fault tree [7] . These fault trees are produced automatically using fault tree construction methods developed previously [4, 5] .
Analysis
Having constructed the CCD it can be used to analyse the system under consideration.
A qualitative analysis will produce the list of causes for each outcome condition. These are established by considering each decision box on the path to a particular outcome and A quantitative analysis will produce the probability of each system outcome. As the algorithm ensures that the probabilities of the decision boxes of the CCD are independent these are obtained by simply multiplying the probabilities of the component events in the branch leading to that consequence. The probability for each consequence for a system is then determined by summing the probability of each path leading to that consequence, as stated by Nielsen [1] .
In order to demonstrate the construction and analysis process described above it is applied to a simple system.
AUTOMATED CCD CONSTRUCTION EXAMPLE
The cause-consequence diagram construction algorithm is now described in detail in relation to the pressure tank system illustrated in 
M
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The data for the components in the system is shown in Table 1 . The failure data shown in the table are not real data but have been assumed here in order to demonstrate the technique described. All the failure modes of the components in Table 1 are revealed except switch, relay 1 and timer, failed closed.
There are eleven decision tables relevant to the components in the example. These are shown in Tables 2 to 12 . As an example of how these decision tables are constructed consider the switch, see Table 2 . Two failure modes have been considered for this component, failed open (FO) and failed closed (FC) as described in Table 1 Table 2 considers all possible combinations of inputs from IN1 and IN2 and all possible states of S and the effects these will have on the output to the J1. The sign "-" in the inputs and state columns of the decision tables indicates the "don't matter" condition, which means that the specified input and component state will result in the specified output regardless of the value of the variable.
For example, for S, there are two causes of current in the output, Table 2 , these are: In order to model the fact that the switch only closes momentarily in this system, functions have to be added to the decision table, see Table 2 . The first function states that: The other tables are constructed in a similar manner. The stopping criteria in this case is that all the components in the system which have the capability to change their outputs have been considered. There are three possible outcomes to consider, when the tank indicates:
• low pressure, i.e. the tank is empty, T: (OUT => LPR);
• high pressure, i.e. the system operates normally or safe, T: (OUT => HPR);
• very high pressure, the failure of some components leads to continuous pumping to the tank and hence its overpressure, i.e. T: (OUT => VHPR).
ii) Construction algorithm: The CCD is constructed in the manner described in section 2.2.1 and shown schematically in Figure 1a .
Step 1: Five circuits are identified in this example:
1) {PS1, J2, C2, R1, J3, J4, C1, J1, PS1};
2) {PS1, J2, C2, R1, J3, J4, S, J1, PS1};
3) {PS1, J2, C3, TIM, R2, J3, J4, C1, J1, PS1}; 4) {PS1, J2, C3, TIM, R2, J3, J4, S, J1, PS1}; 5) {PS2, F, C4, M, PS2}.
Step 2: Since the switch is the initiating component, circuits 2 and 4 are considered as they contain S. Circuit 2 will be considered first.
Step 3: The initiating event is IN1 = CL. Considering the decision table for S, Table   2 , the algorithm searches for the rows whose first column for the input IN1 could take the value CL. These are rows 1, 3, 4 and 5. Considering these in order, row 1 is considered first, hence IN2 = C, State = W, OUT = C. Considering the functions attached to Table 2 it can be seen that function 1 is now satisfied and hence Time = 0.1 min. After a function has been applied all the circuits must be considered before applying any further functions in turn, see rule 4. Decision box 1 is created related to the output OUT = C, see Figure 5a : "Is C in Circuit 2?" i.e. does the switch close and the power supply work?
Step 4: The YES branch of the decision boxes is followed which results in current in the 2nd circuit. In this case considering the components within circuit 2 there is current in:
-OUT of J1 (since C is in IN2 to J1 and IN1 is unknown, row 2 in Table 12 describes the situation);
-OUT of PS1 (row 1 in Table 5 );
-OUT1 of J2 (row 4 in Table 12 );
-OUT of C2 (row 1 in Table 11 );
-OUT2 of R1 (rows 1, 3-5 in Table 3 );
-OUT of J3 (row 1 in Table 12 ) and -OUT2 of J4 (row 4 in Table 12 ).
The stopping criteria has not been satisfied so a check is made of the components in circuit 2 to determine whether any have external output. One such component is identified, R1, as the output from this component is linked to an input of C1 which is in circuits 1 and 3 but not 2.
The decision table for the relay, Table 3 , is now considered. As it has been assumed that there is current in the circuit 2, (YES branch of decision box 1, Figure 5a ), four rows of the table satisfy this (rows 1, 3-5). However, in the 4th row the relay is in a failed closed state, which contradicts the initial assumption that the relay is opened and hence this row is not relevant. The column related to the external output is investigated. Considering rows 1, 3 and 5 in Table 3 in turn, row 1 is considered first.
In this case OUT1 = CL. Hence the decision box 2 is added which contains the question "Is R1: OUT1 = CL?", see Figure 5a .
Step 5: As there are no more components with external output in circuit 2 any other circuits containing S must be considered. Hence circuit 4 is investigated next. A decision box should be created asking whether there is current, or no current in the circuit. However from the path taken (YES branch of decision box 1) and the initial condition for PRS it is known that there is current in circuit 4 and hence this box is unnecessary. Hence any components within the 4th circuit with external output are considered. There are two such components: timer, TIM, and relay 2, R2. The external output OUT1 of the TIM connects to input IN2 of contacts 2, C2, which is in circuits 1 and 2 but not 4. Since there is current in circuit 4 rows 1, 3 and 5 of the decision table for the timer are considered (row 4 is not considered as initially the timer was closed and hence it cannot be in a FO state), see Table 4 . Row 1 is considered first, this gives OUT1 = CL, which coincides with the initial state for this output. As this results in no change to the system rule 3 is applied. Hence the third row of Table 4 is considered next. However, this also gives OUT1 = CL and therefore row 5 is considered. In this case the value of OUT1 doesn't matter and hence is not relevant. As there are no rows left in Table 4 with IN = C, the algorithm searches for any added functions for this component, by rule 3. There is one added function but the conditions for it are not satisfied and hence the next component that is considered is R2. A decision box 4 is created which relates to the entry of OUT1 in Table 3 (same as for R1), see Figure 5a.
Step 6: As the two circuits containing S, circuits 2 and 4, have now been considered the decision table for S, Table 2 ). Thus the decision box 4
in Figure 5a case is that the tank indicates high pressure, T: OUT = HPR.
Step 8 The diagram is in a form where each path contains independent events in the decision boxes and can be quantified with ease.
Fig. 5a
Cause-consequence diagram for pressure tank system {R2_FC}, {PRS_FC, R1_FC}, {PRS_FC, TIM_FC}, {S_FC, PRS_FC}.
Quantitative Analysis
Considering the paths of the CCD leading to VHPR the probability of the system failing and producing very high pressure can be obtained. There are 8 such mutually exclusive paths. The first one leading to the consequence "T: OUT = VHPR", numbered 1 on the diagram, is: YES branches of decision boxes 1-9 and NO branch of decision box 10. The probability of the YES branch of decision box 1 is ( )
Hence the probability of path 1 is given by: 
For unrevealed failures the probability of failure is obtained using θ and τ , given 
The probability of VHPR is obtained by summing the probabilities of all of these paths. Therefore: 
Using the data given in Table 1 and Equations 1-3 the probability of very high pressure in the tank is found to be . This is the same result as would be obtained by taking the four minimal cut sets listed earlier and using the inclusionexclusion expansion [8].
CONCLUSIONS
An algorithm to automatically construct cause-consequence diagrams is developed in this paper. From an initial description of a system the algorithm develops the CCD in a logical manner. Such an automatic construction saves an analyst from a laborious and time consuming task and ensures that all possible system behaviour is modelled.
The diagram generated can be quantified simply to give exact probabilities of all 
